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been condoned, so far as this writer can discover." Even if it was
competent to adjudge a defendant in a criminal case guilty upon a
written transcript, which is doubtful, the action taken in the principal
case would not have come within such procedure because the county
judge in this case did not decide on the basis of a transcript of the
evidence, but rather, merely rubber stamped the commissioner's actions
by a perfunctionary signing of the orders of the day.' 2
The majority's only direct consideration of this point was a state-
ment in its opinion that the appellant raised the argument. There ap-
pears to have been a tacit assumption that if KRS 25.280 could be in-
terpreted to authorize a trial commissioner to try cases in quarterly
court, and if this particular commissioner acted in accordance with
the provisions of the statute in submitting his action to the county judge
for approval, then the case was properly tried by a person with legal
judicial authority and the due process issue was settled.
One is left with the impression that the argument that the hearing
and deciding function were divided in the principal case is too nicely
technical to carry much weight. For from the facts of the case it is
apparent that the commissioner did, in fact, both hear and decide
appellants case, and the signature of the judge was merely a formality.
But if this is true, it would seem to follow that one not having legal
judicial authority improperly exercised a judicial function by trying
the case.
In light of the foregoing discussion it is concluded that even if
KRS 25.280 is construed to allow a trial commissioner to try cases in
quarterly court, he would be competent to gather evidence and submit
his action with recommendations to the judge only in non-criminal
cases. Therefore the appellant in the principal case was improperly
tried and thereby denied due process.
Arthur L. Brooks, Jr.
FuTrrnE INTERESTS-THE Rr AGAINST PERPETUrrEs-CONTINGENT RE-
MAiNDER-CLAsS Gm's-Mary Estelle Sands devised a tract of land to
her son, Howard J. Sands, during the term of his natural life with re-
mainder to his child or children living at the time of his death for
their lives. Upon the death of the last surviving child of Howard J.
11 Apparently the use of trial commissioners to try cases in inferior court is a
situation peculiar to Kentucky. There are no Kentucky decisions on the separation
of the hearing and deciding function in criminal litigation, and this writer has
found nothing directly in point on the subject elsewhere.
2 From facts of the principal case as mentioned in the dissent.
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Sands, or if he die without being survived by a child,1 the land "....
shall pass to and be vested in fee in my sister, Miss Eugenia Williams,
my niece Mrs. Sarah Harvey Boone, my nephews, Eugene Harvey,
Mortimer Harvey, 0. F. Williams, Jr., and John H. Williams, and my
niece Mrs. Frances Mitchell, share and share alike, with the child or
children of any one or more of them who may not be living at the time
of the termination of the life estate hereinbefore created to take, per
stirpes, the same share or shares in said tract of land that it or their
parent or parents would have taken if living at that time. If any one
or more of said nieces or nephews should not be living at the time of
the vesting of sAid remainder, and should not be survived by a child
or children, then his or her share in the remainder shall pass to the
other living nieces or nephews, or to their children as above pro-
vided."2 Howard J. Sands brought an action individually as the only
heir at law of the testatrix, and as executor of her estate, claiming that
the remainder in fee violated the rule against perpetuities and was,
therefore, void. The remaindermen were served with process but re-
fused to defend the will; a pro confesso was taken against them. And
inasmuch as the will was assailed by the executor as being void, the
Chancellor appointed an administrator ad litem to defend it. The
Chancellor ruled that the devise to the remaindermen in fee was valid.
Held: Affirmed. The court held that the remainder in fee was vested,
not contingent, and valid under the rule against perpetuities. Sands v.
Fly, 292 S.W. 2d 706 (Tenn. 1956).
This case indicates the need for reform in the law of future in-
terests. It is almost impossible for courts and lawyers to keep abreast
of the complicated and technical requirements which must be met in
creating future interests. Society, and by reflection the lawyer's prac-
tice, has become far too complex for lawyers to spend the time neces-
sary to master a set of complicated rules designed to meet conditions
generations ago. Nevertheless, until we have reform, lawyers will
I The remainder in fee to take effect upon the death of Howard J. Sands
without children is valid in any event under the rule that "If a gift is made on
two contingencies, stated in the alternative, it is treated as two gifts for the pur-
pose of the rule against perpetuities, and one contingency may be held valid
and the other invalid." Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, see. 1257
(1956). second tract of land was given to Sands for life, remainder to his children
for their lives, with remainder in fee as follows: "upon the death of the last sur-
viving child of Howard 3. Sands . . . I give and devise to my niece, Elizabeth
Pearson, provided she should be then living, and f not then her share in said
tract shall go in fee to her mother, Mrs. Tennie Pearson and her two sisters, Mary
and Geneva, share and share alike. This remainder is not discussed in this com-
ment because it is valid under the rule against perpetuities regardless of how it is
construed. This devise is a contingent remainder with an alternative contingency.
Either must vest if at all within the limits of the rule.
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have to understand these rules if they are to serve their clients well.
In this case a woman left her property to her son and grandchildren
for their lives, and upon their death to remote collateral relatives.
Everybody (the son, the guardian of the children, the remaindermen
and the Court) thought this an unjust devise and cast about for ways
of invalidating it, but apparently no one came up with any doctrine
compelling the desired result. The doctrine was there all right, but
perhaps the Court and counsel should not be chided too severely for
not finding it, in view of the fact that they were working in the ex-
cessively technical, labyrinthine structure of future interests.
The issue directly before the court was whether the devise in fee
violated the rule against perpetuities.3 In deciding that issue it must
first be determined whether the gift is to individuals or to a class. If
the devise is construed as a gift to individuals, the gift to named
remaindermen may be classified as a contingent remainder or a vested
remainder. If it is subject to the condition precedent of surviving the
life tenants (who may include afterborn children of Howard), it will
vest within the lives of the named remaindermen, if at all. If it is not
subject to a condition precedent of survival, it is vested remainder and
not subject to the rule. Thus classified as either contingent or vested,
the remainder to named persons is valid. However, the alternative gift
to the "children;" "per stirpes" of the named remaindermen may be
invalid. If it is subject to the condition precedent of surviving the
life tenants, it will not necessarily vest within lives in being whether
it is construed as an alternative contingent remainder or as an executory
interest (divesting a vested remainder in the named remaindermen).
Therefore, if the remainder is a gift to individuals, there is only one
question: Is the alternative gift to children invalid because subject to
the condition precedent of surviving the life tenants? On the other
hand, if the remainder is construed as a gift to a composite class, 4 and
"children" is construed to mean "issue" or if survival of the life tenants
by the "children" is a condition precedent, the entire remainder is in-
valid.
3 Sands also contended that the remainder to his children for life was con-
tingent and violated the rule against perpetuities. The guardian ad litem for the
-children joined in this contentionl Whether a secondary life estate conditional
upon survival is vested or contingent is doubtful. Simes and Smith, sec. 142, note
32 (1956). But regardless of the classification, the gift to the children of Sands
is plainly valid and the court so held. Sands' children will take possession of the
property at Sands' death, if at all. Equally preposterous was the argument of
Sands that the remainder in fee was limited "in the alternative by way of a con-
tingent remainder after a particular estate in such a way that one may take effect
if the other does not."
4 See Morris and Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities 98, ill. 3 (1956).
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Is this, then, a gift to individuals or to a class? This depends upon
whether the testatrix was "class minded", whether she looked upon
the beneficiaries as an entity.5 Strong evidence that she was class
minded is the provision that if a named remainderman did not survive
the life tenants, his share was to go to his children, or if he was not
survived by any children "to the other living nieces or nephews, or to
their children as above provided." The gift was to be divided up at
the death of the life tenants among persons surviving at that time.
The amount of each remainderman's share was not fixed until the time
for distribution. Treating the property as a pie to be divided up
among persons who survive at a future date tends to show that the
testatrix was class minded, even though the remaindermen were
specifically named.6
Assuming this to be a class gift, it would not be invalid if "children"
means "children" and not "issue" and survival of the life tenants by the
children is not a condition precedent, for the exact share of each mem-
ber of the class would be determined and would vest7 at the death of
the last named remainderman at the latest (the named remaindermen
were in being at testatrix's death). But if "children" means "issue"
or if survival is a condition precedent, the entire remainder is void.
8
It seems clear that by "children" the testatrix meant "issue." She pro-
vided that if any named remainderman did not survive the life tenants
his "children" were to take his share "per stirpes." If "children" means
"children" only, obviously they can only take their parent's share per
capita and never per stirpes. To have a per stirpes distribution, it
5 See 5 American Law of Property, sec. 22.8 (1952) where it is stated that
if the testator looks upon the beneficiaries as an entity and not as separate and
distinct individuals, the gift is one to a class, and that where the terms of the
instrument provide that survivors take the share of any deceased person it is
reasonable to conclude that it is an entity, or class gift.
6 See Parrish v. Van Domelen, 385 Mich. 23, 55 N.W. 2d 158 (1952) where
the court held that where testatrix devised $1000 to her brother and residue to
her brother-in-law, his wife and their four children, all specifically named, the
residue gift was a class gift. There the brother-in-law and wife had witnessed the
will and their legacy was held void. However, the court in construing the residue
as a class gift said their share remained in the residue and was distributable to
the remaining members of the class-the children.
7 "To comply with the Rule against Perpetuities, an interest must be certain
to become "vested" within the perpetuity period of a life or lives in being plus
twenty-one years. An interest is "vested" or the purposes of the Rule when the
following conditions exist-
a) the taker is ascertained, and
b) any condition precedent attached to the interest is satisfied, and
(c) where the interest is included in a gift to a class, the exact
amount or fraction to be taken is determined. This last require-
ment is peculiar to the Rule against Perpetuities: it is not tound
in the definition of a "vested interest" for any other purpose."
Morris and Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 (1956).
8 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, secs. 201-206 (1942).
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would be necessary for some child to have died and his children or
grandchildren to take in his shoes. Thus if the words "per stirpes" are
to be given effect, "children" must mean "issue." Under this construc-
tion the exact amount each member of the class would take could not
be determined until the death of the life tenants, and the last life
tenant might be a person who was born after the testatrix's death.
Is survival by the children a condition precedent to their interest?
If it is, the entire remainder is invalid (assuming it to be a class gift)
and if the remainder is construed as a gift to individuals, the alterna-
tive gift to the children is invalid. The problem here is whether the
court will imply a condition of survival upon an alternative gift (one
that is made in the event that a prior donee does not survive to the
time of distribution). There is a split of authority among the courts
on this problem. English authorities hold that where there is an
alternative gift to issue of the remainderman, the issue do not have to
survive the life tenant in order to take, that there is no implied condi-
tion precedent of survivorship.9 American decisions seem to go three
ways. Some support the view that there is no implied condition of
survival.' 0 Some reach the opposite conclusion." Others take the
view that if the first gift is a vested remainder, there is no implied
condition of survival on the executory interest of the children or issue.'2
A case closely analogous to the situation under discussion is Jeffords
v. Thornal.13 There the testator bequeathed property to his widow
for life with remainder to her children, if any. If the widow left no
children the property was to go "one-half to my brothers and sisters,
if they are living, or if they are dead to be equally divided to their
children. . . ." One of testator's sisters died before the life tenant,
leaving one surviving daughter and the issue of some other children
who had predeceased her. The court held that the requirement of
survival which was attached to the sister's gift was also attached to the
gift to her children. It is evident from the language of the instrument
in the Sands case that the named remaindermen are not to take any-
thing unless they survive the last surviving child of Sands. It is then
expressly provided that the "children" are to take "per stirpes" their
parent's share. And as stated above, "per stirpes" means that if a
9 See Simes and Smith, sec. 659 (1956) and note 15 therein.
10 Porter v. Porter, 226 Mass. 204, 115 N.E. 407 (1917): In re Colman's Will,
253 Wis. 91, 33 N.W. 2d 237 (1948).
11Jeffords v. Thornal, 204 S.C. 275, 29 S.E. 2d 116 (1944); Denison v.
Denison, 96 App. Div. 418, 89 N.Y.S. 126 (1904).
3.2 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Brown, 287 Mass 177, 191 N.E. 358 (1934); In
re Becker's Estate, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 558 (Sirr. 1954); Reynolds v. Branch, 182
Va. 678, 29 S.E. 2d 847 (1944).
13204 S.C. 275, 29 S.E. 2d 116 (1944).
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"child" does not survive, his issue are to take in his place. From this
language it could reasonably be concluded that it was the intent of
the testatrix that survival be a condition precedent to the children
taking. If this is done the devise to the "children" is plainly void as
violating the rule against perpetuities, because the interest of the
children will remain contingent until the death of the last surviving
child of Sands.
The Tennessee Supreme Court did not analyze the problem this
way. As the court saw it, the only question was whether the whole
remainder was "vested" or "contingent." The court seemed to imply
that the remainder, if "contingent", would violate the rule against
perpetuities. The court treated it as a gift to individuals and held the
remainder vested, relying upon an earlier Tennessee decision of Brown
v. Brown.14 The Brown case, however, is not in point. There the devise
was to "my two children and upon the death of either of them without
leaving a child or children, or the issue of such child or children living
at his or her death, to the survivor of them; and should both of my
children die without leaving a child or children living at their death,
then, and in that event, I direct the property... shall go over to ...
the children of my deceased sister ... and of my brother... ; and in
case any of said children should be dead, but leaving children then
living, such child or children shall... take such interest as said parent
would have taken if alive" (emphasis added). This devise does not
violate the rule against perpetuities because, as the court said, "the
limitations over are to take effect immediately upon the death of the
survivor of testator's two children, lives in being at the date of the will
and at the death of testator; hence the contingency upon which the
estate is to rest cannot, by any possibility, . . ."15 take effect after lives
in being. In the Sands case the remainder over could not become
possessory until the death of Sands' children and, unlike the Brown
case, these children were not necessarily all in being. It is assumed
that Sands could have more children, even though the court stated,
"able counsel for the complainant.., contends that the remainders in
the instant case are contingent and void for the reason that the 'con-
ditional element', as to the vesting of the fee simple title, was incorpo-
rated into the gift to the remaindermen. In other words the gift in
remainder was to take effect upon the [death of the] last survivor of a
class holding title. . . " for life. "While the 'conditional element' was
incorporated in the gift to the remainderman, 16 it definitely and con-
14 Brown v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 277, 6 S.W. 869 (1888).
"5 Id. at 6 S.W. 875.16 If it was, how could the remainder be vested? Gray, Rule Against Per-
(ENTUcKY LAW JoURNAL
clusively appears that this condition was satisfied17 at the time of the
testatrix's death, all children of Howard J. Sands being alive at that
time." Was the court saying that Howard could not have any children
born after testatrix's death? If it was, then of course the remainder,
however construed, was valid. What the court meant is doubtful, inas-
much as it went on to say later that the life estate in Howard's
children "opened upon the subsequent birth of children."
How the remainder to the named remaindermen could ever violate
the rule is hard to see, unless the remainder is a gift to a class com-
posed of two or more generations. There was no mention, and prob-
ably no argument, that this was a class gift. If the intention of testa-
trix controls, it seems clear that she was class minded and wanted her
property divided up among persons who survived her grandchildren.
But to give effect to this intention would violate the rule against
perpetuities. Although by classifying the gift as one to individuals
and requiring survival only by the named remaindermen, but not
making it a "condition precedent,"Is the court carried out the testa-
trix's intention as far as permissible, it is doubtful that it should have
been given effect at all. This was, as recognized by the court, "a very
unjust will," and the remaindermen refused to defend it. They could
not convey their interest to Sands and give a clear title to the property
(except for the life estate in Sands' children), because some of the
ultimate takers might be yet unborn. If ever there was a case for strict
application of the rule against perpetuities, this seems to be it. The
equities of the situation could easily have justified the court in apply-
ing the rule to this devise.
Beauchamp E. Brogan
petuities, sec. 108 (1942) states: "If the conditional element is incorporated into
the description of, or into the gift to, the remainderman, then the remainder is
contingent; but if, after words giving a vested interest, a clause is added divesting
it, the remainder is vested."
17 How could the condition that the remaindermen had to survive the life
tenants possibly be "satisfied" while the life tenants were alive?
IsThe court stated that the remaindermen were ascertained when the will
took effect, and that while the will provided that should one of them die without
children surviving, his or her share should go to the survivors, this in no way
postponed the vesting in violation of the statute but was in effect a devise of a
remainder in the alternative. Such reasoning is fallacious inasmuch as there can-
not be a contingent remainder after a vested remainder in fee. Gray, Rule Against
Perpetuities, sec. 210 (1942). Loddington v. Kime, 1 Salk. 224 (1695). If the
children have an "alternative remainder" both it and the remainder in their parents
must be contingent upon the parents surviving the life tenant.
